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Background: Previous research has shown that emotion can significantly impact decision-making in humans. The
current study examined whether or not and how situationally induced emotion influences people to make
inter-temporal choices.
Methods: Affective pictures were used as experiment stimuli to provoke emotion, immediately followed by
subjects’ performance of a delay-discounting task to measure impulsivity during functional magnetic resonance
imaging.
Results: Results demonstrate a subsequent process of increased impulsive decision-making following a prior
exposure to both high positive and negative arousal stimuli, compared to the experiment subjects’ experiences with
neutral stimuli. Findings indicate that increased impulsive decision-making behaviors can occur with high arousal
and can be characterized by decreased activities in the cognitive control regions such as prefronto-parietal regions.
Conclusions: These results suggest that ‘stabilization of high emotional arousal’ may facilitate a reduction of
impulsive decision-making and implementation of longer term goals.
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In a wide range of decision-making contexts, individual
choices are said to be the outcomes of a competitive inter-
action between the following two systems, also known as
the dual-system model: affective system and deliberative
system [1-4]. The affective system is primarily driven by
visceral factors such as negative emotions (for example,
fear) or drive states (for example, sexual desire); therefore,
it relates to individuals’ myopic and impulsive choices due
to people having limitations as to predicting and/or eva-
luating beyond the present moment. The deliberative
system, on the other hand, assesses options with a
forward-looking, goal-oriented perspective; therefore, it
subserves the executive functions, such as planning, thin-
king ahead, or self-control.
Based on the dual-system model, the deliberative system
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in which the affective system is not highly activated. Ac-
cording to the dual-system model, the deliberative pro-
cesses are mainly associated with the outer part of the
brain, including the anterior and dorsolateral regions of the
prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex, while affective pro-
cesses are associated with the inner part of the brain,
including the limbic and paralimbic areas of the brain,
amygdala, ventral striatum (VS), and insular and medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) [2,3]. Therefore, under the in-
fluence of emotional arousal, the affective system elevates
to a sufficient level to activate and weaken the regulatory
functions or effectiveness of the deliberative system [3].
Numerous behavioral studies have also suggested that
situationally induced emotion can also significantly impact
inter-temporal decision-making [5-7]. For example, Wilson
and Daly [5] and Van den Bergh et al. [4] suggested that
males’ discounting rates rise after viewing images that
evoke positive emotion. Similarly, during positive emotion,
extraverted individuals were more likely to show pre-
ferences for immediate yet smaller reward over larger but
delayed reward [7], while under negative emotional stateshis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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than usual without considering possibilities for a long-term
effect [6]. This phenomenon of individuals’ seeking beha-
viors for sooner yet smaller reward over later but greater
reward is called delay discounting, which also relates to
one’s impetuous tendency or impulsiveness, wanting to re-
ceive an immediate reward. This temporal discounting of
delayed rewards has been a widely used assessment tool for
measuring impulsivity or impulsive decision-making [8].
Neurologically, the question is (1) how the brain func-
tions under circumstances requiring an individual’s
inter-temporal choice, and also (2) how myopic and
forward-looking brain systems value rewards under the
influence of emotion. In cognitive neuroscience, it is said
that there are two distinct processes in inter-temporal
decision-making. One is the valuation network, a neural
representation of the subjective values of available deci-
sion options; the other is the cognitive control network,
which comprises processes leading to and supporting
action selection [9]. Peters and Büchel [10] suggest that
inter-individual differences in delay discounting are
likely a result from differences in the way information is
processed in these neural systems. Inability to accurately
represent the incentive value of future rewards (valu-
ation deficit) and/or inability to exert top-down control
over a disadvantageous choice tendency (self-control
deficit) is an example.
Current research findings available provide an under-
standing of the neural mechanisms underlying delay
discounting [9,11,12]. However, such findings are lim-
ited to accurately understand the specifics of neural ac-
tivity, such as changes or differences in brain regions
associated with inter-temporal choice under different
emotional states. More studies are needed that meticu-
lously explore neural activities that occur simultan-
eously with subjects’ inter-temporal decision-making
under emotional changes, especially with visual presen-
tation support using functional magnetic resonance im-
aging (fMRI) results.
This study examined the impact of emotion (both
positive and negative) on subjects’ inter-temporal
decision-making and investigated associated changes
in brain activities in conjunction with arousal condi-
tioning. During the delay-discounting task, neuro-
logical changes in brain activity were explored for each
emotion manipulation, especially the basal ganglia re-
ceiving substantial reward-related information and the
prefronto-parietal regions, previously suggested to be
related to cognitive processes in evaluating future re-
wards and making numerical computation possible
[12]. This study expected that high arousal induced by
emotional stimuli will likely heighten subjects’ prefer-
ences for small but immediate reward than larger re-
ward that is to come later, compared to the neutralconditioning, resulting in greater discounting of future
larger rewards, indicative of increased impulsivity.
Methods
Participants
Twenty healthy male subjects (mean age of 23.95 years
old; ranging 20 to 29 years old, right-handed) partici-
pated in the study. All subjects had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and no history of psychiatric diagnoses
and neurological or metabolic illnesses. None of the sub-
jects were taking any prescribed or over-the-counter
medication on a regular basis at the time of the study.
All subjects were unbiased and uncontaminated before
and during the study. Informed consent was obtained
from the subjects following a general description of the re-
search protocol and were compensated for their voluntary
participation. This study was approved by the Institutional
Review Board at the Seoul National University (protocol #
H-1006-059-321).
Stimulus material
The stimulus materials specifically developed and tested
consisted of 120 pictures representing three emotion
categories: 40 high arousal-positive valence, 40 high
arousal-negative valence, and 40 neutral pictures. For
the experimentation, the researchers developed and
tested a separate stimuli tool from the International
Affective Picture System (IAPS) due to its inapplicabil-
ity in effectively provoking positive and negative emo-
tion in Korean male college students [13]. Affective
pictures were partially drawn from the IAPS [14], then a
unique stimulus material was developed as other studies
previously have performed [15,16]. More specifically, in
composing each stimuli condition, pictures that are
known to provoke high arousal-negative valence and
high arousal-positive valence were selectively chosen
from IAPS [17]. Simultaneously, more photos were ob-
tained from the Internet that contained images of most
frequently used contexts in provoking emotion used in
other similar research [15]. Images prepared for positive
emotion included erotic (bodily) pictures depicting par-
tially or completely naked women. Additionally, photos
that were designed to evoke negative emotion included
scenes showing bodily mutilation. Pictures used for the
neutral emotional conditioning were specially created
by systematically manipulating the pixels of both the
negative and positive pictures into a colored ‘swirl’ so as
to create distorted images with contents becoming
unrecognizable from its original format, serving a com-
parison condition. Based on the arousal and valence
scores that previous studies used [15,18], the images
used in this study were all tested to verify whether or
not the conditions successfully provoked high arousal-
positive emotion and high arousal-negative emotion.
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made in several steps. Three raters prechose 70 pictures
for each of the three categories among 500 pictures col-
lected from the internet and IAPS. One hundred male
volunteers rated 210 pictures for valence and arousal di-
mensions on two nine-point visual analog scales, with
one being the strongest negative valence and nine being
the strongest positive valence, and then rating the degree
of arousal with one being the least arousing and nine be-
ing the strongest arousing. Based on these valence and
arousal ratings, the affective pictures were rank ordered,
and the top 40 pictures for each valence dimension were
selectively chosen. That is, the negative and positive im-
ages were chosen from the extremes of the arousal and
valence dimensions so as to create two distinct conditions:
high arousal-positive valence and high arousal-negative
valence. Finally, another group of 32 participants (separate
from the 100 volunteers who rated the pictures previously,
ranking the 70 pictures for each valence and arousal
dimension) rated these 120 selected pictures (top 40
pictures, each chosen for the total three emotional con-
ditioning stimuli) for valence and emotional arousal
level on the same two nine-point scales. Prior to the ac-
tual testing with the 20 subjects, the usefulness of these
pictures was determined based on the preliminary sta-
tistical findings from the scores collected from the 32
participants to verify whether or not the stimuli served
the originally intended purposes as conditional stimuli
and discriminant from the neutral condition, as ex-
pected by the researchers.
The preliminary findings suggest that both positive
and negative pictures were valid: positive pictures useful
in truly capturing positive emotion and negative pic-
tures also useful in capturing negative emotion (valence:
negative = 1.94 ± .98, neutral = 4.62 ± 1.62, positive =
7.00 ± 0.98, F (1.31) = 47.62, P < .001; arousal: negative =
7.66 ± 1.23, neutral = 3.25 ± 1.63, positive = 7.06 ± 1.22,
F (1.31) = 95.57, P < .001).
Delay-discounting task
During the fMRI run, subjects completed delay-discounting
tasks via a computerized system (see Figure 1). Subjects
were repeatedly presented with two optional choices with a
numeric variance between a smaller but sooner reward and
a larger yet delayed reward by pressing a corresponding but-
ton on a response box [19].
Subjects were asked to make a decision choosing be-
tween a smaller amount of money (that is, 10,000 won,
equivalent USD $9) and any amounts greater than
10,000 won (for example, 11,000, 13,000, 15,000, 20,000,
or 25,000 won) with a varying time frame (that is, 7, 30,
90, or 180 days). These choices were randomly displayed
each time in either to the right or to the left of the re-
sponse box for 3 s to avoid lateralized motor preparationin choosing either one of the two responses. In case sub-
jects missed the opportunity to respond to the question
within the first 3 s, they were given an additional 2 s to
make the selection for the same question during this
period. Others, who responded within the 3 s, waited
during this same time period with a hold screen so they
cannot make changes to the answer already chosen.
Each trial ended with a 3- to 8-s variable inter-trial inter-
val (ITI), giving a total of 12 to 17 s per trial period, so
that participation time in total does not exceed 16 min.
Subjects were informed that, after the experiment, they
would receive a real payment of between 20,000 and
50,000 won in total for two randomly drawn amounts
from their 60 responses (both considering the randomly
selected amount and corresponding matching payment
period) to ensure incentive-compatibility.
Estimation on individual participants’ degree of delay
discounting was based on the formula V = A/(1 + kD),
where V = subjective value of the delayed reward, A = full
amount of the delayed reward, k = the rate at which de-
layed rewards are discounted, D = delay duration. Higher
k values (discounting rates) indicate preferences for im-
mediate rewards.
Experimental procedures
Before beginning with the experiment, participants were
given instructions about the experimental setup and
protocol. Subjects were provided with an opportunity to
participate in a trial of a practice session of the delay dis-
counting task for at least 5 min. Participants were then
led to the fMRI scanner room and positioned in the
whole-body scanner, where they completed the actual
experiment. All stimuli were back-projected onto a
screen and viewed by participants through an angled
mirror. One session was provided per subject, and one
session consisted of a single run that included 60 trials.
That is, the single run was made up of three emotional
conditions (positive, negative, and neutral), yielding a
total of 60 trials. Three types of pictures and delay-
discounting tasks were presented to the participants in a
single run. The order of the emotional conditions was
counterbalanced for each participant to allow random
conditioning of each task and to avoid order effect. Each
trial presented two different pictures (for 4 s) and an in-
struction to passively view the pictures, and then partici-
pants performed delay-discounting tasks. E-Prime 2.0
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA)
was used to present the stimuli and to collect the data.
Immediately following the fMRI experiment, the partici-
pants viewed the same pictures again in the same order
on a computer screen outside the scanner and were
asked to complete two nine-point scales (developed for
this research also used in the preliminary analysis on the
validation of the usefulness of the pictures).
Figure 1 Task design: participants performed delay-discounting task after affective picture presentation.
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Using a 3.0-T magnetic resonance (MR) scanner
(FORTE, ISOL Technology, Republic of Korea), the
blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) changes and
structural MR images were obtained. Specifically, the
BOLD response was measured using the echo planar im-
aging (EPI) sequence (TR = 3,000 ms, TE = 35 ms, flip
angle 80°, 35 slices, slice thickness = 4 mm without gap,
matrix size 64 × 64 mm, field of view (FOV) = 240 × 24
0 mm). T1-weighted fluid-attenuated inversion recovery
(FLAIR) images (TR = 2,800 ms, TE = 16 ms, flip angle
60°, 35 slices, slice thickness = 4 mm, matrix size 256 ×
256 mm, FOV = 240 × 240 mm) were also acquired. A
total of 319 scans were recorded for each participant in
a single session. At the start of each functional scanning
run, the screen remained black for 9 s to allow time for
magnetization to reach the steady state and to allow for
the subjects’ adaptation to the situation. The first three
images were discarded from the analyses.
An event-related fMRI design was used to identify
activated brain regions. Analyses focused on changes
in activation, specifically during the choice epochs
(corresponding to the time between presentation of
the choice and the subject’s recorded response). All
image processing and analysis of this fMRI study was
performed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Im-
aging Neuroscience, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm) implemented in MATLAB 7.1. Individ-
ual scans were realigned and slice time corrected, nor-
malized, and spatially smoothed by an 8-mm isotropic
Gaussian kernel using standard SPM methods. Thevoxel dimensions of each reconstructed scan were 3 ×
3 × 3 mm3 in the x, y, and z dimensions, respectively.
Population inference was made through a two-stage
procedure. At the first level, single-subject analysis
was performed in the context of the general linear
model (GLM), using delta functions convolved with
the canonical hemodynamic responses to event during
each condition. The six movement parameters from
the realignment procedure were included in a general
linear model as covariates. In a second-level analysis,
a random-effect paired t-test analysis was performed
to identify significantly different brain regions acti-
vated during positive or negative conditions in refer-
ence to those of the neutral condition to assess the
significant effect at the group level. In order to pro-
vide a focused test of our hypothesis, analysis
employed a region of interest (ROI) approach. Based
on an extensive literature review, the regions of inter-
est were defined, which included the basal ganglia, the
prefrontal cortex, and the parietal cortex in both
hemispheres. Subsequently, MarsBaR software (http://
marsbar.sourceforge.net) was used to extract the per-
cent signal changes of the activated regions. The de-
termination of the ROIs was made by drawing a circle
of 5 mm in radius based on the voxel of activated clus-
ter in the study among the selected ROIs from the
previous literatures. In agreement with previous stud-
ies, we used a threshold of P < 0.001 uncorrected, ra-
ther than the more rigorous P < 0.05 corrected for the
entire brain volume [20]. An extended threshold of 50
contiguous voxels was then applied to the activation.
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Self-reported emotion and task performance
Subjective ratings on emotional images and behavioral data
are shown in Table 1. Repeated ANOVA was used to con-
firm the valence and arousal dimension of the positive, nega-
tive, and neutral emotion. Findings show that positive
stimuli increased self-reported positive valence (7.05 ± 0.94)
and negative stimuli increased self-reported negative valence
(1.75 ± 0.85), in reference to neutral-stimulus-induced
valence (4.25 ± 0.85, F (1.19) = 72.31, P < .001). Additionally,
positive and negative stimuli increased self-reported arousal
(7.15 ± 1.26, 7.60 ± 1.53), relative to neutral-stimulus-
induced arousal (3.25 ± 1.65, F (1.19) = 49.91, P < .001).
Behavioral analyses showed that discount rates were signifi-
cantly lower during the neutral condition (0.0036 ± 0.0036),
compared to the positive and negative condition (0.0045 ±
0.0033 and 0.0051 ± 0.0048, respectively). This result indi-
cated that subjects’ choice behavior was more impulsive dur-
ing the positive and negative condition, compared to the
neutral condition (F (1.19) = 6.91, P < .05).
fMRI results
Analysis on the BOLD response for the delay discount-
ing following emotional manipulation was conducted by
calculating the following four contrasts: neutral minus
negative (neu > neg), neutral minus positive (neu > pos),
negative minus neutral (neg > neu), and positive minus
neutrals (pos > neu). The ROIs within group analysis are
illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 2, with their x-, y-, and
z-coordinates and cluster sizes.
Neu > Neg
During the neutral condition, compared to the negative
condition, greater activation was detected in the bilateral
inferior parietal gyrus (IPG, Brodmann Area (BA) 39/
40), the bilateral dorsalateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC,
BA 8/9), and the right orbitofrontal gyrus (OFG, BA 11)
(Figure 2A).
Neu. > Pos.
Similar to the results of neutral minus negative condi-
tion, the differences in brain activity for the contrast
neutral minus positive condition was identified in the
right OFG (BA 11) and the left IPG (BA 40) (Figure 2B).Table 1 Self-reported emotional dimension and behavioral re
M (SD)
Negativ
Self-reported emotion Valence arousal 1.75(0.85
7.60(1.53
Delay-discounting task k 0.00045
(0.0033)
*P < 0.05, ***P < 0.001. Note: M (SD) represents means (standard deviations).Neg > Neu Pos > Neu
There were no brain areas that were more active during
the negative and positive condition compared to the
neutral condition.
Discussion
This study examined the impact of emotion on subjects’
inter-temporal decision-making. Behavioral results
showed that delay discounting is likely to be influenced
by the ‘high arousal-positive valence’ and ‘high arousal-
negative valence’ emotion. This indicates that, regardless
of positive emotion or negative emotion, increased im-
pulsive decision-making occurs under high-arousal emo-
tional state, compared to the conditioning of the neutral
state. These findings are consistent with previous studies
such as in Peters et al. [21] that identified a relationship
between greater impulsive decision-making and emo-
tional arousal. For example, Ariely and Loewenstein [22]
found that objects perceived as relatively unattractive in
a non-aroused state became attractive substances during
an aroused state. Herman and Polivy [23] also empha-
sized the role of emotional arousal on increasing cogni-
tive disruption in making consistent decisions among
addicts and dieters. They suggested that emotional
arousal experience can lead to a motivational shift in in-
dividuals’ decision-making to seek immediate satisfac-
tion over long-term goals.
The brain imaging data of this study also illustrated
that brain activity associated with inter-temporal
decision-making can substantially change by a certain
state of arousal. More specifically, decision-making
following exposure to neutral emotion was positively
associated with activity in prefronto-parietal regions,
while decision-making following exposure to high
arousal positive/negative emotion was adversely asso-
ciated with activations in DLPFC, OFG, and IPG. Dif-
ferent from our expectation, we could not find the
activation of the basal ganglia; this might be due to
the insensitive parameter that we used. That is, in-
creased impulsive decision-making is related to situ-
ational high arousal (that is, visceral factors) and
decreased activities in the prefronto-parietal regions,
brain regions responsible for a human’s decision-
making processes associated with the deliberativesults
F
e Neutral Positive
) 4.25(0.85) 7.05(0.94) 72.32***
) 3.25(1.65) 7.15(1.26) 49.91***
0.0036 0.0051 6.91*
(0.0036) (0.0048)
Table 2 Statistical regions of interest
Talairach
coordinates (mm)Brain region BA t_value z_value
x, y, z
Neu > Neg (L) inferior parietal gyrus 39 260 −42, −63, 39 10.6 5.99
−45, −51, 30 7.43 5.03
−54, −60, 24 7.33 4.99
−33, 30, 27 8.63 5.44
(L) dorsalateral prefrontal cortex 9 306 −27, 24, 51 7.44 5.03
−39, 30, 33 7.38 5.01
42, 18, 42 8.41 5.37
(R) dorsalateral prefrontal cortex 8 311 18, 30, 45 7.87 5.19
30 24 51 7.82 5.19
36, 48, −12 8.35 5.35
(R) orbitofrontal gyrus 11 91 45, 33, −15 5.55 4.23
51, −51, 33 6.98 4.86
(R) inferior parietal gyrus 40 156 51, −48, 42 6.55 4.68
60, −48, 42 6.4 4.62
Neu > Pos (R) orbitfrontal gyrus 11 60 42, 39, −12 6.88 4.82
27, 48, −12 4.27 3.53
−48, −57, 45 6.12 4.49
(L) inferior parietal gyrus 40 78 −54, −45, 42 4.91 3.9
−60, −48, 33 4.4 3.61
Note: BA represents Brodmann area; Neu, Neg, and Pos represent neutral, negative, and positive, respectively.
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human cognition. These findings indicate that people tend
to make impulsive decisions during emotionally aroused
states than the state of non-arousal [21], because the delib-
erative system’s ability to exercise regulatory control over
impulsive behavior becomes functional when individuals
are not emotionally excited.
This prefronto-parietal region is also known to play an
important role in explaining the neural mechanisms of
inter-temporal decision-making, which makes delayed
choices with greater reward possible over immediate op-
tions [11,24]. As mentioned previously, Peters and
Büchel [10] suggest that valuation network (that is, dual
valuation system and single valuation system) and cogni-
tive control network play an important role in inter-
temporal decision-making. In particular, choosing larger
yet delayed rewards were associated with increased ac-
tivity in the prefronto-parietal regions, and this finding
is consistent partially with previous research that sug-
gests the dual valuation system in the valuation network
[11,24]. The dual valuation system explains the discrep-
ancy between the short-run and long-run preferences,
reflecting the differential activations of distinguishable
neural systems (so-called β-δ model). Simply put, the
idea is that when people are faced with a choice betweena small but immediate reward and a larger yet delayed
reward, choosing the latter is associated with decreased
activity in the β network including limbic brain regions
and increased activity in the δ network including the lat-
eral orbitofrontal cortex (LOFC) and the dorsolateral
(DLPFC) and ventrolateral (VLPFC) portions of the pre-
frontal cortex and the posterior parietal cortex (PPC).
This study’s findings, therefore, can be interpreted that
the decreased activity in prefronto-parietal regions dur-
ing the high-arousal states results in the inability to ac-
curately represent the value of future rewards.
In addition to these effects of the valuation system,
decision-making is also said to be affected by the cogni-
tive control network. Opting for a larger yet delayed re-
ward requires cognitive control to precisely evaluate the
trade-offs among outcomes occurring at different points
in time, preventing from making automatic responses
seeking immediate rewards, and thus, making longer de-
lays elicit activation in cortical regions involved in cogni-
tive control [11,24]. One function of the prefrontal
cortex (PFC) during delay discounting is the exertion of
cognitive control to overrule short-sighted choices [25].
As Peters and Büchel [10] suggest, inter-individual dif-
ferences in the degree of PFC recruitment contribute to
inter-individual variability in discounting, with greater
Figure 2 Neuroimaging results: brain regions activated in delay discounting task. (A) Neutral minus negative emotional condition. (B) Neutral
minus positive emotional condition. (C, D, E) Shown are the mean activations of the orbitofrontal gyrus (OFG), inferior parietal gyrus (IPG), and
dorsalateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) expressed as percent signal change. In these regions, activation was greatest in the neutral condition.
Neu neutral, Neg negative, Pos positive.
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control and, as a result, less impulsive decision-making.
In this study, PFC was significantly less activated when
making decisions during high arousal-positive and high
arousal-negative emotion states than in the neutral emo-
tion condition. These findings indicate that high arousal
inhibits individuals’ exerting top-down cognitive control
of the PFC.
This study offers meaningful information to the current
literature. This is the first fMRI study to investigate and
identify neural activity that accounts for the impact of in-
duced incidental arousal on inter-temporal decision-
making. Implications of this study include broadening our
understanding on the impact of the high-arousal state onthe increased likelihood of individuals’ preferring smaller
and earlier rewards, as opposed to waiting for larger re-
wards that is to come later. This is explained by high
arousal reducing our cognitive consideration for the future
as well as inhibition of cognitive control. These results
may explain the fundamental reason why irrational deci-
sions are made and less accurate problem solving is per-
formed during periods of intense emotion, compared to
periods of mild emotion or relaxation [1]. This emphasizes
the need for ‘stabilization of high emotional arousal’ in at-
tempts to facilitate a reduction of impulsive tendency,
maintenance of self-control, and implementation of longer
term goals. The study findings may be useful in providing
valuable information for assisting clinical interventions in
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sive decision-making, such as self-regulation strategies
using meditation that are used to facilitate relaxation.
This study, however, is not exempt from limitations, such
as the focus being on young healthy male college students,
which may limit the generalizability of the study findings
to the overall population, especially for people with limited
cognitive functioning. Future research is suggested to
broaden the sample selections considering diverse age, gen-
der, and psychological health statuses that may exhibit dif-
ferences in the way people react to stimuli and behave
under emotional states and compare with the current find-
ings to verify the applicability of the experiment conditions
as well as key findings. Future research may also consider
exploring differences in decision-making and brain activity
associated with different levels of arousal, that is, high and
low, or different emotions that are within the same valence
dimension, such as sadness and anxiety, as Lerner and
Keltner [26] suggest. Incorporation of this aspect by distin-
guishing the level of arousal for the experiment condition-
ing, that is, high arousal-positive valence (for example, joy),
low arousal-positive valence (for example, calmness), high
arousal-negative valence (for example, fear), and low
arousal-negative valence (for example, sadness) may add
greater precision in determining the effects of emotion on
inter-temporal decision-making and brain activity.
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